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CONFLICT-OF-LAWS RULES BY TREATY:
RECOGNITION OF COMPANIES IN A
REGIONAL MARKET
Eric Stein*
term "recognition" has many meanings. We speak in family
law of a "recognized child," in public international law of recognizing a newly emerged state or newly installed government, and
in private international law (conflict of laws) of recognizing foreign
judgments or legal persons. In both public and private international
law, it is the nation-state that grants or denies recognition. In public
international law, the "recognizing" nation-state expresses "a value
judgment acknowledging that a given fact situation is in accord
with the exigencies of the international legal order." 1 In private
international law (or conflict of laws), on the other hand, the "recognizing" nation-state agrees to extend to its own system certain
legal effects attributed to a fact situation in the legal system of another nation-state.
In a pluralistic, horizontally organized world community of nation-states, "recognition" has been a traditional instrumentality for
cohesion, even though nation-states have exercised wide discretion
in appraising various fact situations and, particularly in public international law, have often employed recognition in pursuit of national foreign policy without reference to the demands of the legal
order. However, within a more closely integrated federal or regional
community of states, public international law is displaced-to a
greater or lesser extent, depending upon the degree of community
integration-by "internal" law; and the discretion of one member
state in granting or denying recognition of judgments or legal persons, including companies, of another member state is curtailed by
normative constraints designed to protect common interests of the
community.
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• Professor of Law and co-director of International and Comparative Legal Studies,
University of Michigan. J.U.D. 1937, Charles University, Prague; J.D. 1942, University of
Michigan. This Article is based on materials contained in a book entitled HARMONIZATION OF "EUROPEAN" COMPANY LAws, THE PROCESS OF NATIONAL REFORM AND TRANSNATIONAL COORDINATION, scheduled for publication by the 13obbs-Menill Company,
Inc. The author wishes to acknowledge gratefully the valuable assistance he received
from Dr. Georg Sandberger of the University of Tiibingen Faculty of Law.
1. Rigaux, Les personnes morales en droit international privt!, 24 ANNAi.ES DE DROrr
'Er DE SCIENCES POLITIQUES, 241, 245 (1964),
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I. THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
AS A REGIONAL COMMUNITY
The European Economic Community (EEC or Community) is
today the most "integrated" regional community of nation-states.
It is based on a multilateral treaty-the Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community2-which embodies an intricate design for a progressive coalescence of the national economies of the
six "sovereign" member states (Belgium, the Federal Republic of
Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) into
a single "Common Market" and eventually into an economic union.
The Common Market embraces the "four freedoms": freedom of
movement of goods, freedom of movement for workers, freedom of
movement for individuals and companies to enter business and to
supply services across national frontiers, and freedom of movement
for capital throughout the territory of the Community.3 Moreover,
a system of Community-wide rules is necessary in order to ensure a
legal order for fair, qualified competition. A common Communitywide policy must govern agriculture, transportation, and commercial relations with nonmember nations. National economic and
monetary policies are to be "coordinated" so as to advance growth
with stability; and social policies are to be "harmonized." To make
this system function smoothly the Treaty provides for a set of new
Community institutions, the most important of which are the independent "executive" Commission4 and the Council of Ministers,is
which share the lawmaking power, and the Court of Justice. 6
II. Is THERE A NEED FOR UNIFORM CONFLICT-OF-LAWS
RULES ON RECOGNITION OF COMPANIES THROUGHOUT
THE COMMUNITY?
Commercial companies are the dominant mode for the conduct
of business in the modern world. Thus, it is not surprising that the
Community scheme is particularly concerned with such companies
and contemplates that segments of the presently divergent national
2. Done at Rome March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. See
also Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951, 261

U.N.T.S. 140; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, April 27,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167.
3. EEC Treaty arts. 9 to 37 (goods); arts. 48 to 51 (workers); arts. 52 to 66 (establishment and supply of services); arts. 67 to 73 (capital).
4. EEC Treaty arts. 155 to 163.
5. EEC Treaty arts. 145 to 154.
6. EEC Treaty arts. 164 to 188.
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company laws be "coordinated" so as to be more similar to one
another in terms of the protection afforded to shareholders, investors, and creditors.7
The authors of the EEC Treaty recognized that if companies
are to help integrate national markets into a common marketmuch as American corporations have helped to create a single
continental market in the United States-the legal order must enable such companies to progress from the classic import-export
pattern to a stage at which they create relatively permanent "establishments" beyond their mm states' borders.8 In American constitutional parlance, the company which has been engaged only in
"interstate" business must be free to "enter" another state with a
view to doing "intrastate" business there. In order to be able to
effect this entry, however, the company must be "recognized" as a
legal person in the receiving state; otherwise it will not be able
legally to carry on business there, to make contracts, or to sue and
be sued in local courts. An analogous situation prevails in the
EEC. If a company organized in one member state wishes to do
business in another member state, it must be "recognized" in the
receiving state as a legal person.9 The freedom to establish a business
(freedom of establishment) 10 and the freedom to supply services
across national frontiers 11-freedoms which the EEC Treaty sought
to ensure throughout the Community for the benefit of the companies of member states-could not be effectively achieved without
the concomitant assurance of "recognition" of such companies. Although the obligation to recognize in this context appears to be
implicit in the Treaty, the member states undertook explicitly in
article 22012 to negotiate about securing "mutual recognition of
companies ·within the meaning of article 58."13
7. See generally, Scholten, Company Law in Europe, 4 COMMON MARKET I.Aw REVIEW [C.M. L. REv.J 377 (1967); Stein, Assimilation of National Laws as a Function of
European Integration, 58 AM. J. INTL. L. I, 16-17 (1964).
8. U. EVERLING, THE RIGHT OF EsTABLISHMENT IN THE COMMON MARKET 1J 105 (1964).
9. See Beitzke, Anerkennung und Sitzverlegung von Gesellschaften und juristischen
Personen im EWG Bereich, 127 ZEITSCHRIFI' FUR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSRI:CHT [Z. GES. HANDELSR. u. WIRTSCHR.J I, 2 (1964) [hereinafter Beitzke, Anerkennung]; Grossfeld, Die Anerkennung der Rechtsfiihigkeit juristischer Personen, 31
RABELS ZEITSCHRIFI' [RABELS Z.] 1 at 16-17 (1967), [hereinafter Grossfeld, Die Aner-

kennung].
IO. EEC Treaty arts. 52 to 58.
II. EEC Treaty arts. 59 to 66.
12. EEC Treaty art. 220: "Member States shall, insofar as necessary, engage in negotiations with each other with a view to ensuring for the benefit of their nationals:
••• -the mutual recognition of companies within the meaning of Article 58, second
paragraph. • ••"
13. For the text of article 58, see note 36 infra.
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In the absence of uniform conflict-oUaws rules, the question
whether a foreign company will be recognized or denied recognition
is determined in each member state by its own conflict-of-laws rules
which serve to identify the applicable law. These conflict-of-laws
rules vary considerably from state to state. In the Netherlands the
applicable law is the law of the state of the company's incorporation,14 while in the other five member states the law of the state of
the company's "real seat" (central administration) applies.15 The
"real seat" rule is reflected in national legislation, case law, and in
some treaties; but there are important variations in its application
among those states which adhere to it.16 It is said that so long
14. Law of July 25, 1959, [1959] Staatsblad No. 256. See van der Heijen &: van
der Grinten, HANDBOEK VOOR DE NAAMLOOZE VENNOOTSCHAP NAAR NEDERLANDSRECHT
76, 83-85 (8th ed. 1968); E. RABEL, 2 THE CoNFLicr OF LA.ws: A CoMl'ARATIVE STUDY 34'
(2d ed. 1960).
15. See note 16 infra.
16. France: Art. 3 of the Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 642, [1966] D.S.L. 265,
on commercial companies provides: "Companies whose [real] seat (siege social) is
situated on French territory are subject to French law. Third persons may rely on
the registered seat but the company may not invoke it as against third parties if its
[real] seat is situated in another place" (i.e., in a place other than the registered seat).
See comment in F. LEMEuNIER, 1 LA REFORME DES SoCIETES CoMMERCIALES 14 (1966).
However, article 154 of the same law (which follows the earlier rule contained in the
Ordinance of January 7, 1959, [1959] J.O. 640, [1960] BL.D. 447) sanctions a transfer
of the seat to another country, upon approval in an extraordinary shareholders' meeting, without the loss of legal personality of the company, but only if the receiving
country has concluded with France a "special convention" permitting the acquisition
of its "nationality" and preserving the legal personality upon transfer to its territory.
See Convention Concerning Conditions of Residence Between France and Belgium,
Oct. 6, 1927, [1927] D.P. IV. 396 (France), 66 L.N.T.S. 49. See also H. BATIFFOL, TRAITE
ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE No. 193-98 (3d ed. 1959).
Federal Republic of Germany: In one German case, a company incorporated in a
state of the United States for the exploitation of Mexican mines, with its main office
in Hamburg, fraudulently sold shares in Germany to German residents. In a suit by
defrauded shareholders, the German courts refused to consider the company an American corporation and thus refused to apply the law of the state of its incorporation.
Since the company failed to comply with the requirements of German stock-company
law, it was not considered a German stock company; and the courts consequently
applied the German law on noncorporate associations. Judgment of March 31, 1904,
9 DJZ 555 (Deutsche Juristenzeitung), 33 JW 231 Guristische Wochenschrift). See also
Judgment of Jan. 19, 1918, RGZ 73, 76; Judgment of Jan. 19, 1882, 7 RGZ 68. On
the other hand, in the situation in which the company does not have its real seat in
Germany and the state of the company's real seat follows the incorporation principle
(for example, a Delaware corporation with its real seat in Kentucky), German courts
will apply the law of incorporation with respect to that company, and not the law
of the real seat. See the case of Eskimo Pie Corp., 117 RGZ 215, 217 (1927). Some
writers advocate the "law of incorporation" rule: see, e.g., Beitzke, Anerkennung 13
and references in that Article.
Belgium: Article 197 of the Code de commerce, ConE COMM. art. 197 (Pasinomie
1935), provides that all companies whose "principal establishment" is in Belgium are
subject to Belgian law; and article 196 states that companies organized and having
their seat (siege) abroad may conduct their operations and appear in courts in Bel•
gium. In 1965 the Cour de cassation in Lamot v. Societe Lamot Ltd., 65 R.EvuE PRA.TIQUE
DES soCIETES 136 (1966), held that these provisions allow an English company to transfer
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as recognition is governed by divergent national rules, freedom of
establishment within the Community cannot be properly safeguarded.17 In addition the need for recognition may arise and must
be ensured outside the context of establishment and supply of services. Thus a company, organized and operating in a member state,
can be denied standing to sue in another member state on a contract for sale of goods, unrelated to any supply of services, unless
the company is recognized in that other state as a legal person with
a capacity to sue. For these reasons, uniform conflict-of-laws rules
respecting recognition of companies by member states may be desirable for the realization of a Common Market.18
its "real seat" to Belgium without a loss of legal personality. but that they subject the
company to the mandatory rules of Beligian company law.
Luxembourg: Article 159 of the Law of Aug. IO. 1915, on commercial companies
follows the Belgian article 197; and article 158 of that law follows the Belgian article
196.
Italy: Article 2505 of the Codice civile. C. Cxv. art. 2505 (Hoepli 1964). states:
"Companies organized abroad which have on the territory of the [Italian] State the
seat of their administration or the principal object of the enterprise (sede dell'
amministrazione ovvero I'oggetto principale dell' impresa) are subject to all provisions
of the Italian law, including those on the validity of their constitutive act." See also
C. Cxv. arts. 2437, 2506·10 (Hoepli 1964).
On these problems generally, see Conard, Organizing for Business, in 2 .A:MmuCAN
ENTERPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET-A LEGAL PROFILE I, 61-65 (E. Stein
Be T. Nicholson ed. 1960); J. R.ENAULD, DRorr EUROPEEN DES soCJtrfs 2.28-2.35, 2.65-2.66,
6.04-6.07 (1969).
With respect to the United States, see A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLIC'l'
OF LAws 408-23 (1962); and R. LEFLAR, .A:MmuCAN CONFLicrs OF LAw 55-68 (1968). With
respect to the United Kingdom, see A. DICEY & J. MoRRIS, ON THE CONFLIC'l' OF LAws
481-97 (8th ed. 1967).

17. See Beitzke, Zur Anerkennung von Handelsgesellschaften im EWG-Bereich, 14
AU$ENWIRTSCHAFI'SDIENST DES BETRIEBS-BERATERS 91, 99 (1968) [hereinafter Beitzke, Zur
Anerkennung]; Dieu, La reconnaissance mutuelle des socit!tes et personnes morales dans
les Communautes europt!ennes. 1968 CAHIERS DE DRorr EUROPEEN 532, 534; Goldman, La
reconnaissance mutuelle des socit!tt!s dans la Communaute t!conomique europeenne, in
t.TUDES JURIDIQUES OFFERTES A LtoN JULLIOT DE LA MoRANDIERE PAR SES tl.tvES EI' SES AMIS
175, 176-85 (1964) [hereinafter Goldman, La reconnaissance], in which the differences in
the national statutes, case law, and treaties are described in detail. These differences,
and the additional reasons why a new convention was considered necessary, are as follows: (1) The Netherlands applies the "incorporation theory," while the other five
signatory states follow the "real-seat" theory; (2) the real-seat theory could result in
a refusal of recognition when the real seat of the foreign company is in the state in
which recognition is sought-as it does in the Federal Republic of Germany-or it
could lead to the application of purely local (forum) law to such a company-as it
does, for example, under article 197 of the Belgian Code de commerce, as interpreted
by the Cour de cassation (see note 16 supra); (3) the duty of recognition under existing
bilateral agreements and under the Hagne Convention Concerning Recognition of the
Legal Personality of Foreign Companies, Associations, and Foundations, 1 AM. J.
COMP, L. 277 (1952) (English text) [hereinafter Hagne Convention], does not encompass
all companies and legal persons covered by EEC article 58; and (4) the traditional
public-policy exception is much too broad for Community purposes (see text accom•
panying notes 85-98 infra).
18. Beitzke, Zur Anerkennung 91.
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When national company laws become more similar as a result
of the "coordination" and "spontaneous assimilation" discernible
in the current national-law reforms within the member states,19 the
need for uniform conflict-of-laws rules on recognition of companies
will undoubtedly be reduced. But the need for such uniform rules
will by no means be eliminated, since company laws will surely
continue to differ in many respects. Moreover, these company laws
will still be a part of the respective national statutory systems and
will thus remain subject to change by the national lawmaker.
Consequently, it is unlikely in the foreseeable future, if ever, that
company law, unlike, for instance, restrictive-practices law,20 will
become "federal-type" Community law. It will, therefore, continue
to be necessary to look to the appropriate national conflict-of-laws
rules in order to determine whether a foreign company will be recognized as a legal person and, if it is so recognized, what law should
govern its internal and external relationships. 21 Although the problem has traditionally been posed in terms of these two distinct and
separate questions, some believe that there is little sense in such
separation.22 Indeed from a practical viewpoint, "any legal person
is such only in relation to a specific legal issue, such as his capacity
to sue, to be sued, or to hold property," and it is in a sense artificial
to speak of a recognition of a legal person in the abstract. 23
III.

BASES FOR RECOGNITION:
OR THE

A.

"LAw

THE "REAL SEAT" RULE
RuLE

OF INCORPORATION"

The Competing Interests

The modern functional rationale for the Anglo-American-and
Dutch-rule of incorporation is the need for certainty and maxi19. See E. STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF "EUROPEAN" COMPANY LAws-THE PROCESS OF
NATIONAL REFORM AND TRANSNATIONAL COORDINATION ch. IV (to be published in 1970).
20. Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty list several restrictive practices which arc
"incompatible with the Common Market."
21. 13eitzke, Anerkennung IO; Grossfeld, Die Anerkennung 3.
22. Drobnig, Kritische Bemerkungen zum Vorentwurf eines EWG-Obereinkommens
ilber die Anerkennung von Gesellschaften, 129 Z. GES, HANDELSR. u. WIRTSCHSR. 93,
113-14 (1966), takes the view that recognition is a real issue only if it is linked with a
conflict-of-laws rule determining which law governs the internal and external
relationships of the foreign company.
A third and separate question, in addition to the two stated in the text, relates to
the prerequisites for the "establishment" of the foreign company, or-in American
terms-for its "qualification" to "do business" locally. In the absence of treaty obligations, these prerequisites are determined by the national law of the state of establishment. See Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: The Loss of Reason, 47 N.C. L. R.Ev. 1
(1968).
23. A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 16, at 408.
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mum uniformity in the choice of law. There can be no doubt about
the situs of incorporation of a company, no matter where the actual
corporate administration and operations may be. The "real seat"
rule, on the other hand, favors the law of the central administration
or principal place of business for choice-of-law purposes. The rationale is that only that approach secures proper regard for economic reality and prevents fraud on, or "abuse of, the law." 24 This
rule, which is followed to a varying degree in all member states
except the Netherlands, has been criticized on the ground that the
task of determining the location of the company's real seat is often
difficult and "might impose a heavy burden upon the litigants and
the courts in close cases."25
In terms of the private and governmental interests involved, the
problem may be posed in the form of a series of questions: When
private parties organize a company, should they enjoy the freedom
or "autonomy" to choose the governing law for the company, just
as they enjoy similar freedom-particularly on the Continent, and
to a somewhat more limited extent in the United States-in selecting the governing law for a contract?26 Or is it necessary, in view of
certain interests of a higher order,27 for the company to be governed
by the law of the state of its "real seat" from which it is administered? At times, the question is posed in a less detached formulation,
with a pointed reference to the Delaware and New Jersey experience:
Should a state, whether one of the United States or a member state
of the EEC, be permitted to adopt, in pursuit of its own economic
interests, an "exorbitantly" liberal company law with the purpose
of attracting an inordinate number of companies which in fact would
have little more than a formal connection with its territory? And
should that state be entitled to expect other states-in the context
of economic intercourse-to "recognize" such companies as properly
constituted legal persons?28
A recent German study of policy considerations underlying these
two competing principles stresses the difference, in terms of the
24. Id. at 411; H. BATIFFOL, supra note 16, at No. 194.
25. Reese &: Kaufmann, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs; Choice of Law and
the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 CouJM. L. REv. 1118, 1127 (1958).
26. G. KEGEL, INTERNATIONALF:S PRIVATRECHT 205-12 (2d ed. 1964); with respect to
the autonomy of the parties generally, see Yntema, "Autonomy" in Choice of Law,
l .A1.r. J. CoMP. L. 341 (1952).
27. See text following note 30 infra.
28. With respect to the movement in the United States opposing an excessively
broad application of the incorporation theory (the problem of the "tramp" or
"pseudo-foreign corporation"), see Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate
Regulation and Investor Protection, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 193, 194-96 (1958); and
Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137, 138-43 (1955).
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socioeconomic impact, between applying conflict-of-laws rules to
simple contracts and applying them to commercial companies which
today constitute the most common organizational form of significant enterprise in any national economy.29 Whereas the contract
law contemplates the widest autonomy of the parties, the company
law in most Continental states contains a great number of mandatory rules which reflect national legal and economic policies.80 As
a result, the state naturally seeks to have its law applied to all those
enterprises which center their activities on its territory; it wants to
make sure that these enterprises do not "escape" its control by
claiming to be governed by the law of another state with perhaps
a more liberal or, in any case, a different system. A variety of governmental interests, real or imaginary, may be involved, including
the protection of local creditors and investors and protection of
the competitive position of local companies. The assumption is, of
course, that significant systemic differences exist between the legal
orders concerned, and that as these differences give way to a measure
of consensus on questions of economic, social, and legal policy, the
intensity of the governmental interest of the national lawmaker in
the application of its own law will decrease. Then, the freedom of
parties to choose their o·wn law may readily be given a broader
scope, as is contemplated by the incorporation rule.
In practical terms, the problem in the EEC today is posed by
the fact that the Dutch law resembles more the "liberal" or permissive "enabling type" act, such as is found in Delaware, than it
does the laws of the other five member states, which are substantially more regulatory and restrictive. 31 The fear persists in some
quarters within the Community that because of the greater freedom
afforded by the Dutch law, entrepreneurs will be lured to incorporate in the Netherlands to the prejudice of the other member states
with stricter company laws.
The principle of incorporation has been meeting with increasing
favor from lawyers in Germany, France, Switzerland, and Italy; 82
and it has been gaining ground in international forums such as the
Institute of International Law,33 and in the more recent international
29. Grossfeld, Die A.nerkennung ll0.
30. Id. at 22-29. See also the conclusions of the Procureur General at the Belgian
Cour de cassation in two ancient cases involving recognition of a French stock company:
Judgment of Feb. 8, 1849, [1849] Pas. Beige 1. 221; Judgment of Jan. 20, 1851, [1851]
Pas. Beige 1. 307. Cf. Judgment of July 22, 1847, [1847] D.P. II 2, 171 (French cours
royales).
31. See note 15 supra.
32. See Beitzke, A.nerkennung 13; van Hecke, Nationality of Companies Analysed, 9
NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFr VOOR lNTERNATIONAAL RECHT 223, 227 (1961).
33. See the rules of the Institute of International Law, approved on Sept. 10, 1965,
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agreements, such as the 1956 Hague Convention Concerning Recognition of the Legal Personality of Foreign Companies, Associations, and Foundations.34 The Hague Convention, which has not
yet come into force, was conceived as a treaty not limited to any
particular region or regional market, although thus far all the signatories are from Western Europe. Article 1 of the Hague Convention enunciates the incorporation principle in general terms,35 but
article 2 significantly limits the reach of that principle: "If a company organized in one state establishes its real seat in another state
it must be recognized in a third state only if the state of the real
seat has accepted the incorporation theory." Thus the Hague Convention embraces the incorporation principle only qualifiedly.
If the opposition to the rule of incorporation has been receding
somewhat, this trend may be due in some measure to the integrating
effect of the rapidly growing international trade, to the emergence
of the multistate corporation which no longer operates in the
confines of a single nation-state, and generally to intensified transnational intercourse. But as article 2 of the Hague Convention demonstrates, the trend is taking effect only gradually.
B.

The Regional Context

The important article 58 of the EEC Treatyl6 clearly mirrors the
changing currents within a regional context. Although it ostensibly
concerns only admission to business activities and not conflict-of-laws
and recommended for adoption "to all States"; the rulCl! are reproduced in Institut de
Droit International: The Warsaw Session, 60 .ru.r.. J. INTL. L. 517, 523 (1966) [hereinafter
I.I.L. Draft], and discussed in Drucker, Companies in Private International Law, 17
INTL. 8e CoMP. L.Q. 28 (1968).

!l4. See note 17 supra. Five ratifications are required for the Convention to come
into effect. Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and Luxembourg signed; and all
but Spain and Luxembourg ratified.
!l5. Article 1 provides:
Legal personality, acquired by a company, association, or foundation under the
law of the contracting State where the formalities of registration or publication
have been complied with and where its charter seat is located, shall be recognized
as of course in the other contracting States, provided that, in addition to the
capacity to proceed in court, it imports at least capacity to hold property and to
enter into contracts and other legal acts.
Legal personality, acquired without formality of registration or of publication,
shall be recognized as of course, under the same condition, if the company,
association, or foundation has been established in accordance with the law that
governs the same.
!l6. Article 58 provides:
Companies constituted in accordance with the law of a Member State and having
their registered office, central administration or principal establishment within the
Community shall, for the purpose of applying ihe provisions of this Chapter, be
treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of member states.
The term "companies" shall mean companies under civil or commercial law
including co-operative companies and other legal persons under public or private
law, with the exception of non-profit companies.
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rules, it necessarily assumes that the admitted company will be recognized, since without recognition the admission to do business
would be illusory. Article 58 postulates Community-wide freedoms
of establishment and of supply of services87 for companies and
legal persons which are organized in accordance with the law of a
member state and have their registered office, central administration, or principal place of business within the Community. Thus,
it does not require that the "real seat" (central administration) be
in the state under whose law the company is organized or, for that
matter, that it be anywhere in the Community.38 A literal interpretation would suggest that merely a registered office anywhere within
the Community territory would suffice to satisfy article 58. This
broad interpretation, however, has not been entirely accepted because, pursuant to article 52, paragraph I, individual nationals of
the member states may claim freedom of establishment in another
state only if they are already "established" within the Community,
and because companies are to enjoy the same, but not more extensive, benefits as natural persons.39 Accordingly, the General Programs
for the Removal of Restrictions on the Right of Establishment and
on the Free Supply of Services, adopted by the Council of Ministers,
provide that when the companies "have only their registered office
within the Community .. ., their business activity shall show a continuous and effective link with the economy of a member state ..."
before they can claim the benefits of the Treaty.40
The liberal posture embodied in article 58 is obviously related
to the coordination of national company laws which is prescribed
by the Treaty. This coordination effort-and generally the harmonization of national laws and economic and social policies-are
expected to advance freedom of establishment and also remove the
obstacles to a more liberal recognition practice. As a short-range
objective, however, the member states agreed that the obligation
to grant recognition should be strengthened; and they chose an international convention as the vehicle to achieve that objective.
37. Although article 58 expressly deals only with establishment, article 66 provides
that article 58 shall also apply to supply of services.
38. See Beitzke, Anerkennung 13; Dieu, supra note 17, at 539-43; Goldman, La
reconnaissance 189-94; Grossfeld, Die Anerkennung 17.
39. EEC Treaty art. 58.
40. 5 JOURNAL OFFICIEL DFS CoMMUNAUTES EuROPUNNFS [E.E.C. J.O.] 36 (1962). See
also id. at 33. In order to provide a framework for a progressive implementation of the
Treaty provisions on the freedoms of establishment and of supply of services, the
Council of Ministers adopted the two "General Programs," which define categories of
national discriminatory restrictions on access to the many enumerated occupations and
professions, and fix deadlines within which these restrictions must be removed.
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CONVENTION ON THE MUTUAL RECOGNITION
OF COMPANIES AND LEGAL PERSONS

A.

The Origin

The task of drafting the Convention on the Mutual Recognition
of Companies and Legal Persons41 (1968 Convention or Convention
on Recognition of Companies) was entrusted to a working group
composed both of staff members of the EEC Commission and of
experts appointed by the member governments.42 With Professor
Berthold Goldman of the Paris Law Faculty as an effective, albeit
stern, chairman, the group labored for three years. It had at its
disposal a report prepared by Professor Beitzke,43 and it completed
the first draft of the Convention on June 11, 1965. The Commission
concurred in this draft on January 5, 1966; and the final text, containing certain modifications desired by the Governments, was ready
in October 1967. The text was to be signed in December 1967, but
this plan did not reach fruition because of the Netherlands' reaction to General de Gaulle's attitude toward the admission of the
United Kingdom to the EEC.44 The 1968 Convention was finally
41. Convention sur la reconnaissance mutuelle des societes et personnes morales,
signed on Feb. 29, 1968, 4 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPEEN [REv. TRIM. DR.
EuROP.] 400 (1968) [hereinafter 1968 Convention]. The text of the 1968 Convention in
the four official languages and in an unofficial English translation is reproduced in
12 BULL. E.E.C. SUPP. No. 2 (1969). An unofficial English translation of the 1968
Convention may be found in 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 'if 6083 (1968).
Extensive literature deals with the problem of the relationship between the 1968
Convention and the recognition of companies in the EEC. See J. RENAULD, supra note
16, at 6.02; Beitzke, Zur Anerkennung; Capotorti, Il problema del reciproco riconosci•
mento delle societd nella Comunitd economica europea, 11 R.lvISTA DELLE soCIETA 969
(1966); F. CARUSO, LE SOCIETA NELLA CoMMUNITA ECONOMICA EUROPA 217 )1969); Cerexhe,

La reconnaissance mutuelle des socit!tt!s et personnes morales dans la Communautt!
t!conomique europt!enne, 1968 REvuE DU MARCllE COMMUN 578 (1968); Dieu, supra note
17; Drobnig, Conflict of Laws and the European Economic Community, 15 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 204, 207-10 (1966-67); Drobnig, supra note 22; Gessler, Gegenseitige Aner•
kennung von Gesellschaften und ]uristischen Personen im EWG-Bereich, 1967 DER
BETRIEB 324; Goldman, Le projet de convention entre les t!tats membres de la Com•
munautt! t!conomique europt!enne sur la reconnaissance mutuelle des socit!tes et
personnes morales, 31 RABEL<; Z. 201 (1967) [hereinafter Goldman, Le projet]; Goldman,
The Convention Between the Member States of the E.E.C. on the Mutual Recognition
of Companies and Legal Persons, 6 C.M. L. REv. 104 (1968-69); Goldman, La reconnaissance; van der Grinten, Erkenning van vennootschappen en rechtspersonen in de
Europese Economische Gemeenschap, 14 SOCIAAL·ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING 201 (1966);
Grossfeld, Die Anerkennung 16-21, 46-48; Houin, Ou en est le droit des socit!tt!s dans
le Marcht! commun, 4 REv. TRIM. DR. EuRoP. 131, particularly 145-47 (1968); van Hecke,
Erkenning, zetelverplaatsing en fusie, in EuROPEES VENNOOTSCHAPSRECHT, LE REGIME
JURIDIQUE DES SOCIETES DANS LA CEE 149 (1968).
42. See Rapport concernant la Convention sur la reconnaissance mutuelle des
socit!tt!s et personnes morales, Rapporteur: Goldman, 4 REv. TRIM. DR. EUROP. 405, at
para. 1 (1968) [hereinafter Rapport Goldman]. See also Beitzke, Zur Anerkennung 91.
43. Beitzke, Anerkennung 1-47.
44. See Beitzke, Zur Anerkennung 91.
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signed on behalf of the six Governments by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs on February 9, 1968.
A clause in the preamble affirms that the ministers approved the
1968 Convention when "meeting within the forum of the Council."
The ministers employed this somewhat controversial formula in the
past when they had reached an agreement on a matter not specifically authorized in the Treaty, but falling generally within its
orbit.45 In the Commission's view, the recourse to this procedure
endowed the 1968 Convention with a status different from an ordinary treaty: The agreement was, a Commission spokesman declared,
"the first European Convention supplementing the Treaty of
Rome." 46 Although this factor may be politically significant, the
1968 Convention is still an interstate treaty governed in principle
by international law. It is important to note that the Convention
did not become a "Community act" in the technical sense and thus
presumably would not fall within the jurisdiction of the Community Court of Justice.47 Nevertheless, in addition to the fact that
it was drafted under the auspices of the EEC, the text of the 1968
Convention confirms the close link between the Convention and
the Community.48 Moreover, the fact that the 1968 Convention
was concluded exclusively among the member states of the Community and will come into effect only after all members have ratified
45. See Rapport fait au nom de la Commission juridique sur les actes de la
collectivitt! des Etats membres de la Communautt! ainsi que sur les actes du Conseil
non prevus par les traites, Rapporteur: Burger, [1968-1969] EUR. PARL. Do~., No. 215
(1969), and literature cited therein.
46. Comm. Spokesman's Group (EEC), P-14/68, Information Memo (Brussels,
undated).
47. According to article 173 of the EEC Treaty, the Court of Justice has the
authority "to review the lawfulness of acts other than recommendations or opinions
of the Council and the Commission." The most important reviewable "acts" (regulations,
directives, decisions) are defined in article 189.
48. See, for instance, the references to the EEC Treaty, specifically to articles 220
and 58, in the preamble to the 1968 Convention; article 10 of the 1968 Convention
(discussed in text accompanying notes 96-98 infra); the last clause of article 11 of the
1968 Convention, indicating the controlling role of the EEC Treaty; articles 12, 13, 15,
16, and 19 of the 1968 Convention assigning certain ministerial functions to the
Secretary General of the Council of the Communities; article 18 of the 1968 Convention,
requiring the President of the Council of the Communities to call a conference for a
revision of the Convention if requested by a contracting party; and the 1968 Convention's articles 19 (four authentic texts), 17 (unlimited duration) and 14 (requirement
of ratification by all six members) which were obviously inspired by the corresponding
articles in the EEC Treaty. It was also agreed to publish the 1968 Convention for
information purposes in the Official Journal of the Communities (E.E.C. J.O.), Rapport
Goldman para. 45. The 1968 Convention refers throughout to "Contracting States" and
"territories to which the present Convention applies"; but the preamble makes it clear
that the states that concluded the 1968 Convention were "The High Contracting
Parties to the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community."
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it40 indicates the close relationship between the Convention and
the Community.
The original draft of the 1968 Convention contained an article
similar to the corresponding provision in another "European Convention," the Convention on Judicial Jurisdiction and Execution
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. 60 This article reflected the assumption that any state which in the future would
join the Comm.unity would be required to adhere to the Convention on Recognition of Companies-perhaps with certain adjustments to be negotiated at the time-as well as to the EEC Treaty
itself. This provision was dropped in the final text, and all that
remains is a joint declaration which is included in a Protocol annexed to the Convention and in which the parties declare their
readiness to negotiate with any state "associated" (and by inference
with any state that will become associated) with the Community,
with a view toward mutual recognition of companies along the
lines of the basic principles of the 1968 Convention and in the
context of the agreement of association. 111 However, in the minutes
of their meeting, the Ministers recorded their unanimous opinion
that any state which joins the Comm.unity must also adhere to the
1968 Convention. This statement is of immediate interest in view
of the impending negotiations with the United Kingdom, Denmark,
Ireland, and Norway concerning admission to membership in the
Community.
B.

The Benefiting Companies and Legal Persons

According to article 1 of the 1968 Convention, all companies
formed under civil and commercial law, including cooperatives,
49. Art. 14. The 1968 Convention was approved by the French Parliament, Law of
Dec. 20, 1969, [1969] J.O. 12436.
50. Art. 63. That Convention was signed on Sept. 27, 1968. The French text was
published by Conseil des Communautes europeennes, undated. The English unofficial
translation is in 12 BULL. E.E.C. SUPP. No. 2 (1969); and authentic texts are given in
the respective French, German, Dutch, and Italian versions of the same supplement.
See Hay, The Common Market Preliminary Draft Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments-Some Considerations of Policy and Interpretation, 16 AM.
J. CoMP. L. 149 (1968); Nadelmann, The Common Market Judgments Convention and
a Hague Conference Recommendation: What Steps Next?, 82 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1282 (1969);
Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora in Treaties on Recognition of Judgments:
The Common Market Draft, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 995 (1967); Nadelmann, The Outer
World and the Common Market Experts' Draft Convention on Recognition of Judgme:nts, 5 C.M. L. R.Ev. 409 (1968).
51. EEC Treaty article 238 provides that: "The Community may conclude with a
third country, a union of States or an international organisation agreements creating
an association embodying reciprocal rights and obligations, joint actions and special
procedures." A number of such agreements have been concluded, but the content varies
considerably.
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must be recognized, without more, if they were organized under
the law of a state party to the Convention,52 and if they have their
registered seat (siege statutaire, satzungsmiissiger Sitz) in a territory
to which the Convention applies. Article 8 makes it clear that any
such company may not be denied recognition even if it is not considered a full-fl.edged legal person under the law in the state in
which it was formed; the company must be recognized so long as,
under that law, it has the capacity to sue or be sued in its own name,
as in the case of the German partnership (offene Handelsgesellschaft). In addition, article 2 extends the benefit of recognition to
all legal persons organized under public or private law, other than
companies, so long as they meet the same conditions as companies
must and so long as they are engaged in an "economic activity"
normally performed for remuneration.
A comparison of this definition of the benefiting companies and
legal persons with that contained in article 58 of the EEC Treaty
reveals some interesting differences. 53 First, while article 58 appears
to exclude "non-profit companies," 54 the 1968 Convention benefits
companies of civil and commercial law, whatever the purpose or
nature of their activities; their legal form, not their purpose, is the
determining factor. Thus companies of civil law are included under
the 1968 Convention, even though under the laws of some member
states they may be organized for a nonprofit purpose. 55 On the
other hand, companies of commercial law are conclusively presumed to engage in "commercial" activity and thus, under the 1968
Convention definition, to pursue a gainful purpose, even though
in fact they may not be so doing in an isolated case. 56
52. The term "state" will hereinafter primarily be used to indicate a state party to
the Convention.
53. See, Beitzke, Zur Anerkennung; Cerexhe, supra note 41, at 582; Dieu, supra
note 17, at 537; Rapport Goldman para. 9-14; Goldman, Le projet 214; van der Grinten,
supra note 41, at 204-08. .
54. Cerexhe suggests that article 58, "despite its rather paradoxical language," in
effect does not purport to require gainful purpose for companies of civil or commercial
law. Cerexhe, supra note 41, at 584.
55. Under § 705 of the German Civil Code, BGB § 705 (Kolhammer 1957), a
company formed pursuant to the Civil Code may pursue any purpose, including a
nonprofit purpose. Such a company, however, is excluded from the coverage of the
1968 Convention, because it cannot sue or be sued in its own name. See §§ 50, 736 of
the Zivilprozessordnung, ZPO §§ 50, 736 (C.H. Beck 1967). See also Beitzke, Zur
Anerkennung 93. On the other hand, the societd semplice of the Italian law and the
vennootschap onder firma of the Netherlands law are included within the coverage of
the 1968 Convention. See Declaration commune No. 1, attached to the 1968 Convention.
56. Such a company might be a charitable institution run by a stock company, as
provided for in § 6 of the German Commercial Code, HGB § 6 (C. H. Beck 1968).
With respect to the German partnership (offene Handelsgesellschaft) under commercial
law, see HGB § 105 (C. H. Beck 1968), which requires a "commercial" and therefore
gainful purpose (Handelsgewerbe).
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A second extension of the 1968 Convention's coverage beyond
the scope of article 58 of the EEC Treaty, stems from article 2 of
the Convention which extends coverage to all legal persons other
than companies, provided they meet the prerequisite of economic
activity normally performed for remuneration. 57 This new verbal
formulation 58 was substituted for the "gainful purpose" prerequisite of article 58 because that article, if construed narrowly, might
not include certain enterprises which, the national experts felt,
should be covered by the Convention. The experts particularly had
in mind nationalized enterprises; mixed private-public companies
providing public services; and certain modem organizational forms
of economic activity which are of entirely private nature, such as
companies established by industrial enterprises to supply those enterprises with services relating to research, market surveys, or the
protection of industrial property rights-fields in which a profit
motive may not be directly involved. Yet the experts were fully
aware of the vagueness of the new concept when they drafted the
provision.59

C. Prerequisites for Recognition: Optional Limitations
For recognition purposes, it is sufficient for the companies and
legal persons covered by articles I and 2 to have their registered
seat anywhere within the Community, even if they have their real
seat outside the Community. For instance, a company organized
under Dutch law with a real seat in the United States would be
covered by the recognition provisions of the 1968 Convention. Thus
a registered seat-not a real seat-is the minimum contact required
for a claim for recognition. This requirement is, as has been shown,
in accord with the literal reading of article 58 relating to the freedoms of establishment and of supply of services. 60 The "real seat"
is defined in article 5 of the 1968 Convention as the place of the
"central administration." This definition coincides with that of the
Hague Convention and with that of the national law in the member
states.61 If this were the entire story, the victory of the incorpora57. More specifically, such legal persons are included under article 2 if their principal
or accessory purpose is "economic activity normaly performed for remuneration," or
if they actually engage in such activity on a continuing basis without thereby infringing
the law under which they were formed.
58. But see EEC Treaty article 60 which speaks of "services normally supplied for
remuneration."
59. Rapport Goldman paras. 10-12.
60. See note 37 supra and text accompanying notes 37-38 supra.
61. Rapport Goldman para. 18. I.I.L. Draft (discussed supra note 33) defines "the
actual seat of a rompany" as "the place at which it has its principal center of control
and management even if the decisions which are taken at that place follow directives
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tion principle would be complete with regard to recognition. However, following the pattern of the Hague Convention,62 the concession
made in the first two articles by the "real seat" advocates is in part
taken back in articles 3 and 4.
First, in article 3, each state is left free to declare that it will
deny recognition to any company whose real seat is outside the
territories to which the 1968 Convention applies, if the company
does not maintain a genuine link (lien serieux, wirkliche Verbindung) with the economy of one such territory. This rather vague
limiting clause differs somewhat from the corresponding, and equally
vague, limitation grafted upon article 58 of the EEC Treaty by
the above-mentioned General Programs,68 and it may cause difficulties of interpretation. It is clearly designed to prevent a non-Community enterprise from claiming recognition within the Community
on the basis of nothing more than a "post office box" address (a
registered seat) in the Netherlands.
Second, article 4 deals with the status of a company which claims
recognition in the signatory state where its real seat is located, but
which was organized under the law of another signatory state, in
which it has its registered seat. In such a situation, under the prevailing national laws, if the real seat were located in the Federal
Republic of Germany, recognition of such a company in that country could be denied, whereas if the real seat were in Belgium, Italy,
Luxembourg, or (since the 1966 reform) France, the law of the
real seat would be applied without denial of recognition. 64 The 1968
Convention formula for dealing with this situation was worked out
in a special meeting of the Ministers of Justice of Belgium, the
given by shareholders who reside elsewhere." Drucker, supra note 33, at 34. With
respect to the concept of "central administration," see E. RABEL, supra note 14, at 40-41.
62. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
63. The General Programs require "a continuous and effective link with the
economy of a Member State." See note 40 supra. The Goldman report acknowledges,
but does not explain the divergence. See Rapport Goldman para. 18. The International
Court of Justice has held that a state cannot lay down rules governing the grant of
its nationality and claim that these rules
are entitled to recognition by another State unless it has acted in conformity with
the general aim of making the legal bond of nationality accord with the individual's
genuine connection with the State which assumes the defense of its citizens by
means of protection as against other States.
Lichtenstein v. Guatemala (Nottebohm case), [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 24 (emphasis added).
See also the concept of "real connection,'' discussed in note 66 infra.
64. See Rapport Goldman paras. 3-4; CODE COMM. art. 197 (Pasinomie 1935) (Belgium); C. CIV. art. 2505 (Hoepli 1964) (Italy); article 159 of Luxembourg's Law of
Aug. 15, 1915, concerning Commercial Companies; article 3 of the French Law of
July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 642, [1966] B.L.D. 353. See note 16 supra.
Theoretically, a refusal of recognition in this case could be justified on the ground
that such a company is entitled to equal, but not more favorable, treatment as com•
pared with local companies. See text accompanying note 74 infra.
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Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The ministers considered the problem in the context of a company which had been incorporated in
good faith in the Netherlands, and which, after it had operated
for a time in and from the Netherlands, decided for good business
reasons to transfer its central administration (real seat) to another
signatory state. According to the final solution embodied in article
4 of the 1968 Convention, a state may declare that it will apply the
mandatory provisions of its own law to a foreign company whose
real seat is in its territory. However, it may apply its nonmandatory
(optional) provisions to that company only if the company's charter
does not contain a reference to the law of the state under which it
was formed or if the company is unable to show that it has in fact
conducted its activity during a "reasonable time" in the state of
its formation.
One problem with the formula is that it may be difficult to determine in some instances whether a provision is mandatory or
optional in a given system. The mandatory provisions of company
law generally include rules on the formation of companies. Thus,
the argument could be made that if, according to the mandatory
rules of the state in which the foreign company has its real seat, the
company is not validly constituted, it may be denied recognition.
The Dutch experts strongly opposed such an interpretation as defeating the objective of recognition, and they received substantial
support from some other delegations. Without taking a position on
this argument, the German delegation posed a series of searching
questions and demanded that a uniform interpretation be agreed
upon. Evidently the German experts were troubled by a political
nightmare: A foreign company, possibly organized abroad by Germans with German capital, could maintain its central administration
in German federal territory and claim recognition there as a foreign
company, even though the workers would not be represented on
the company's supervisory board as required by the federal law on
workers' "codetermination."65 The German demand, however, was
opposed by some who argued that the experts should not be expected to interpret their own texts and by others who considered
the problem of limited practical importance. Apparently, the experts have not reached an understanding on an interpretation.
Thus, any problems that may arise under article 4 will have to be
resolve on a case-by-case basis, without reference to an agreed inter65. With respect to the "codetermination" in the Federal Republic of Germany, see
Vagts, Reforming the "Modem" Corporation: Perspectives from the German, 80 HARv.
L. REv. 21!, l!0, 64-75 (1966), with references to the German federal legislation.
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pretation. Nevertheless, the text of article 4 itself makes fairly clear
the intention of the draftsmen. They intended to prohibit a refusal
of recognition by the state of the real seat, and instead-as a compromise-authorized that state to impose its own law on the recognized company. The practical effects of this formula are uncertain
and could vary from state to state depending on local law. The
formula has all the disadvantages of complexity and ambiguity that
characterize a laborious compromise. Although the solution represents some progress over the Hague Convention,66 the prospect of
living under nvo different company-law systems is fraught with so
many uncertainties, particularly if the requirements of the two systems should not be compatible, that the affected company is likely to
feel compelled to transfer its real seat to the state in which it was
formed, in order to avoid the operation of article 4.67
The state's option under article 4 to impose its own law upon a
foreign company is limited to the case in which the company's real
seat is in its own territory; if the real seat is in a different territory,
article 4 does not apply. More specifically, a company organized in
state A, with its real seat in state B, must be recognized in state C
even if state B follows the real-seat principle. This result is another
small improvement over the Hague Conven~ion formula which
demands recognition in this situation only if state B adheres to the
principle of incorporation.68 The result called for by the Convention
on Recognition of Companies is desirable in this case since the
interest of the "third" state, where recognition is claimed, in having
its own law applied is not as pervasive as it might be if the real seat
were also located in its territory. But the adopted solution could still
lead to a situation in which a company is viewed in a third state as
governed by the law of the state of its formation, while the state of
66. Article 2 of the Hague Convention (see note 17 supra) allows refusal of
recognition in this situation unless the real seat is transferred to a state which follows
the principle of incorporation. Similarly, articles 3 and 4 of the I.I.L. Draft would
permit refusal of recognition by the state of the real seat if the company's charter does
not accord with the law of that state, unless (and this is a deviation from the Hague
solution) the company carries its principal business activity in the state of incorporation
(article 3) or has "real connection" with the territory of that state (article 4). This "real
connection must be established by facts other than the mere indication of a
registered office, and may in particular consist of a place of business in the territory,
of the origin of the share or loan capital of the company, of the nationality or habitual
residence of the shareholders or of those in control of the company" (article 4).
67. See Beitzke, Zur Anerkennung 94; van der Grinten, supra note 41, at 208. In
order to reduce the threat to legal security that is posed by the options left open in
articles 3 and 4, the 1968 Convention provides that the states which desire to take
advantage of those options must make the necessary declarations, at the latest, when
they deposit their instrument of ratification (article 15).
68. Hague Convention art. 2(2). See also articles 8 and 4 of the I.I.L. Draft.
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the real seat is free to apply its own mandatory law to the company
pursuant to article 4. The fact that article 4 allows for such an outcome indicates that the 1968 Convention does not achieve the fullness of uniform treatment which is a major, if not the paramount,
objective of conflict-of-laws rules. 60
D.

Effects of Recognition

Reflecting the "traditional solution of private international
law," 70 which is also apparent in the Hague agreement, article 6 of
the 1968 Convention provides that a company or legal person which
is entitled to recognition by virtue of the Convention shall have the
same capacity that it has under the law of the state in which it was
organized. But here again the 1968 Convention contains limitations
designed to ensure the forum state a degree of freedom to apply its
own law.71
The first such limitation derives from article 4 which can come
into play, as has been stated, 72 when the real seat of the company is
situated in the state in which recognition is sought while the situs of
incorporation is in another member state. Among the rules of its
own law which the state of the real seat is free to apply to the foreign
company might be a provision affecting the capacity of the company.1a
Second, pursuant to article 7, the state in which recognition is
claimed may deny the foreign company specific rights which under
its mm law are also denied to local companies of a "corresponding
type." Any such limitation, however, cannot have the effect of depriving the foreign company of its basic capacity to be the subject of
rights and obligations, to enter into contracts and undertake other
legal acts, and to sue and be sued.74 Furthermore, the foreign company which receives such limited recognition cannot itself invoke in
court the limitations allowed by article 7. Thus, the limitations are
exclusively for the protection of local parties that contracted with
the company.76
69. See Grossfeld, Die A.nerkennung 47. But see Beitzke, Anerkennung 20.
70. "Conformement a une solution traditionnelle du droit international prive ••••"
Rapport Goldman para. 23.
71. For analogies in American law, see A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 16, at 409, 413.
72. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
73. Rapport Goldman para. 23.
74. Cf. Hague Convention art. 6. Further limitations are permitted in article 6 of
the I.I.L. Draft.
75. This was considered by some an improper discrimination against foreign
companies. See, e.g., van der Grinten, supra note 41, at 209. But see Rapport Goldman
para. 25.
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The limitations on recognition which are possible under articles
4 and 7 are based on a rather esoteric distinction between two concepts: on the one hand the "general capacity" consisting of the
"abstract aptitude to take part in legal life" 76 as "a distinct entity"
which is determined exclusively by the law of the state of incorporation; and on the other hand, the specific rights "which form the
concrete content of the general capacity"77 and which in the first
instance are also determined by the law of the state of incorporation,
but which the state where recognition is sought may deny by reference to its own law,78 within the limits described above.79 This
abstract analysis lends support to those who consider it futile to
attempt to draw a sharp distinction between "recognition" and the
conflict-of-laws rules which determine the law governing the capacity
and specific rights of the foreign company.80
When one speculates on the future application of these limitations, he must keep in mind that the 1968 Convention seeks to
ensure certain minimum rights normally associated with and derived
from recognition, but does not deal with the freedoms of establishment and of supply of services, which involve rights connected with
speciftc activities. 81 Thus, on the one hand, a German company need
not be established in France, or supply services there, in order to
claim the right to sue in a French court on its contract to purchase
goods or to hire personnel in France; its right to sue derives from
the recognition in France of its general capacity and is specifically
guaranteed by article 7 of the Convention.82 On the other hand, if
under French law a local limited-liability company is excluded from
the banking business, a German limited-liability company-of a
"corresponding type"--could also, presumably, be excluded from
that business in France, again, in accordance with article 7. Moreover, the German company, in seeking to enter the banking business
in France, could not rely on the EEC Treaty provisions concerning
establishment and supply of services, since, under those provisions,
France is required to accord the German company only equal treatment with that accorded to its own companies.83
76, Rapport Goldman para. 24.
77. Id.
78. Id. See Hague Convention art. 5.
79. See text accompanying notes 74 and 75 supra.
80. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
81. See also Hague Convention art. 7.
82. That right is also a necessary corollary of the rights of establishment and supplv
of services, as applied to specific occupations and professions. See note 40 supra and
accompanying text.
83. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
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There is, finally, another group of restrictions related to article 7
which may be illustrated by the rule in German law confining
membership on the executive board (Vorstand) of German stock
companies to natural persons and making legal persons ineligible
for membership. It could hardly be argued that a foreign stock
company formed in a state which does not have such a restriction
could be denied recognition in the Federal Republic under article 7
solely because its executive board includes another company-that
is, a legal rather than a natural person-among its members. Professor Goldman takes the optimistic view that this type of question is
not likely to arise very often in practice. In his opinion, the differences among the national laws governing the two types of companies
that one is most likely to encounter in transnational business-that
is, the stock company and limited-liability company-are no longer
very marked so far as the rules concerning capacity are concerned;
and the differences which do exist will be further reduced in response to the coordination of national laws.84 Some may argue, however, that Professor Goldman is overly optimistic about the amount
of progress which can be achieved through coordination.

E. The Exception of Public Policy (Ordre Public)
In the field of conflict of laws, the exception of public policy
(ordre public) traditionally enables the forum state to refuse to
apply foreign law which would otherwise govern under its own
choice-of-law rules. Thus, for instance, the Hague Convention stipulates that its provisions governing recognition may be disregarded
by a signatory state on the ground of ordre public.85
In the framework of the EEC, a public-policy exception formulated in such general terms as that of the Hague Convention appeared inappropriate. For that reason the draftsmen of the Convention on Recognition of Companies sought to restrict the scope of the
exception; in article 9 they limited the application of that exception
to situations in which the company claiming recognition contravenes-through its charter purpose, through the objective which it
seeks to achieve, or through the activities in which it is in fact engaged86-the principles which the forum state considers a matter of
84. See Goldman, La reconnaissance 194-96.
85. Hague Convention art. 8.
86. This formula, enumerating the "purpose,'' "objective,'' and actual activity, is
an expanded version of the clause in the Franco-German Convention of Establishment
and Navigation of 1956, which served as its inspiration. It is designed to prohibit states
from refusing recognition on the basis of rules governing the constitution and
functioning of the company. See Rapport Goldman paras. 28, 29-30.
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public policy "in the private international-law sense."87 The draftsmen, however, did not attempt to provide a uniform definition of
the concept of public policy "in the private international-law
sense." 88 This approach somewhat resembles the approach taken in
the United States, where the exception of public policy remains
operative among the states of the Union. Although in principle the
scope of the exception in this country is defined by state law, its
reach has been reduced by the courts in the choice-of-law setting,
and its application in that setting is subject only to a very loose
control of the United States Constitution. 89 In a somewhat different
setting, however, American courts, relying on the full faith and
credit clause of the Constitution, have for all practical purposes
eliminated public policy as a ground for the refusal to "recognize"
the judgments of sister states.90
It was suggested during the negotiations on article 9 of the 1968
Convention that the concept of public policy should be made a part
of Community law, common to all states and applicable not only to
recognition of legal persons, but also in other contexts, such as that
involving the Convention on Judicial Jurisdiction and Execution of
Judgments.91 The Governments, however, evidently were unwilling
to go that far in the direction of unification. On its face, article 9
seems to assume that, subject to the above-mentioned vague limitation,92 it is for each state to supply its own definition of "public
policy" in applying the exception. Nevertheless, in view of the consistent case law of the national courts of the signatory states, public
policy "in the private international-law sense" was clearly intended
to encompass only the fundamental political, social, and economic
precepts of the forum state; in any case it was understood to be less
comprehensive than the French "internal public policy" (ordre
public interne).93 Thus, although the uncertainty of the protean
87. See Article 9 of the 1968 Convention.
88. See generally Beitzke, Zur Anerkennung 96; Cerexhe, supra note 41, at 588-90;
Dieu, supra note 17, at 545; Rapport Goldman paras. 27-32; van der Grinten, supra note
41, at 209.
89. For a discussion of constitutional impact in the choice-of-law setting, see A.
EHRENZWEIG, supra note 16, at 28-33.
90. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951). See generally B. CURRIE, SELECTED
ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 196, 272-73, 625-26 (1963); A. EHRENZWEIG, supra
note 16, at 138-39; Reese &: Kaufmann, supra note 25, at 1137, 1143.
91. See note 50 supra.
92. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
93. Article 30 of the Introductory Law to the German Civil Code, EGBGB art. 30
(Palandt 1969), which deals with the German equivalent of what the Convention
describes as the "ordre public in the private international law sense,'' provides that
"the application of a foreign law is excluded if the application would be contrary to
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concept of public policy has been reduced somewhat in the 1968
Convention, it probably still encompasses not only certain fundamental rules of statutory national law, but also the underlying principles and policies as well.
Article 9 singles out one specific instance in which the exception
of public policy may not be invoked. It provides that if the so-called
"one-man company" may lawfully exist in its own state, it cannot
be denied recognition in the other states on the ground of public
policy.u Although national company laws in the Community at
present do not allow a company to be initially organized by a single
founder, both German and Dutch laws do acknowledge the continuing existence of a company even if, after its formation, all of its
shares are acquired by the same person; and French law follows this
view with regard to foreign companies when the law governing those
companies acknowledges such continuing existence. The Belgian
courts, however, have steadfastly refused, on grounds of public
policy, to recognize such "one-man" companies.95 From the viewpoint of the Belgian Government, this provision of article 9 offers
a convenient opportunity for replacing an outdated and obnoxious
judge-made rule.96 Article 9 does not provide an express answer to
the question whether the forum state could impose personal liability
on the single shareholder, but perhaps a subsequent directive on the
coordination of the company laws might tackle this thorny problem.
good morals or to the purpose of a German law." Despite this broad language, the
courts construe the exception narrowly, permitting refusal only if the application of
foreign law should "attack directly the foundations of the German political or economic
life" or if it should be "outright unbearable for the German legal order in terms of its
legal concepts and in its measure of good morals." G_ KEGEL, supra note 26, at 184-87
(citing cases as 184-85). Similarly, article 31 of the Italian Codice Civile, C. Crv. art. 31
(Hoepli 1964), provides in broad language that in no case may foreign laws, regulations,
entities, or contracts have effect in Italy "if they are contrary to the public order or
good morals (costume)." Yet the courts have limited the exception to ensuring "respect
of the highest and most essential interests" of the Italian legal order. Parazza v. Garde, 6
Giust. Civ. I 242 (1955), (Corte di Cassazione), and other cases cited in V. MARTINO,
CODICE CIVILE, CoMMENTO CON LA GIURISPRUDENZA 33 (4th ed. 1964). In France, a
distinction is made between "ordre public interne" (or more accurately, "ordre public
au sens du droit civil interne") which is illustrated by article 6 of the Code civile,
C. Crv. art. 6 (172d ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1965), providing that parties cannot
derogate by contract mandatory rules of the law-and "ordre public international" (or
more precisely, "ordre public au sens du droit international prive"). See H. BATIFFOL,
supra note 16, at No. 367. In France, still another notion of "ordre international public"
concerns "les grands problemcs internationaux."
94. See also Rapport Goldman paras. 28-29.
95. See I J. VAN RYN, PRINCIPES DE DROIT COMMERCIAL §§ 492-93 (1954).
96. In fact, the Belgian Government is presently considering reforming its company
law relating to one-man companies, The reform law would allow a stock company to
act as a sole founder in forming a subsidiary. This proposal goes beyond any national
law in the Community in allowing formation of a one-man company.
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Article 10, which also relates to the public-policy exception,
makes it clear that any "principles and rules" of national law that
are contrary to the EEC Treaty may not be considered national
public policy for the purpose of denying recognition under article 9.
The experts apparently had in mind certain principles-such as
discrimination on the ground of nationality in the field of establishment-which, although eliminated among the members of the Community, may remain applicable in the member states vis-a-vis
nationals of countries outside the Community.97 Yet article 10 would
probably also apply to the non-self-executing provisions of the EEC
Treaty or to Community directives, if a member failed to implement those provisions in its national law, although the experts
obviously did not wish to contemplate the likelihood of such noncompliance. One interesting practical effect of article 10 may be that,
in case of litigation before a national court concerning recognition,
that court may be required, in accordance with article 177 of the
EEC Treaty,98 to refer to the Community Court of Justice the question of interpretation of that provision of the EEC Treaty which
the relevant national policy is alleged to contravene.99
F. Toward a Uniform Interpretation?
The Community Court of Justice would seem to be the logical
forum for ensuring an effective application and, above all, a uniform
interpretation of the 1968 Convention, since national courts are
likely to diverge in their interpretation of some of the Convention's
general and often ambiguous formulas. But, as indicated above, the
jurisdiction of the Community Court does not extend to the 1968
Convention,100 although it could be so extended if a clause to that
effect were included in the text of the Convention. One possible
legal basis for a clause so extending the Court's jurisdiction might
be found in article 182 of the EEC Treaty, which enables the Court
to assume jurisdiction over Treaty-connected disputes between two
member states if those disputes are submitted to the Court by virtue
of a special agreement (compromis, Schiedsvertrag). If article 182
were used as the basis for jurisdiction, however, such jurisdiction
could extend only to disputes between member states and could not
97. See Rapport Goldman para. 21.
98. EEC Treaty art. 177: "The Court of Justice shall be competent to make a
preliminary decision concerning: (a) the interpretation of this Treaty. • • ."
99. See Cerexhe, supra note 41, at 590,
100. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
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extend to controversies between private parties. Considering the
nature of the 1968 Convention, this limitation would gravely impair
the utility of the Court's role. Moreover, the majority of the experts
reportedly interpreted article 182 to require a special agreement for
each separate dispute. Such a narrow interpretation seems to preclude using article 182 as a basis for jurisdiction.
A more promising basis for a clause in the 1968 Convention
giving the Community Court of Justice jurisdiction over Convention disputes is offered by article 177 of the EEC Treaty.101 According to that provision, a national court, hearing a case between
private parties, may-and if it is a court of last instance, mustcertify to the Community Court any question of "interpretation ...
of acts of the institutions of the Community," if a ruling on this
question is necessary to reach a decision in the case. By inserting an
appropriate clause in the Convention, it would be possible to extend
the authority of the Court under article 177 to cases before national
r.ourts involving questions of interpretation of the Convention. No
amendment of the EEC Treaty would seem necessary to achieve this
purpose. At the time the 1968 Convention was drafted, however, the
member states were apparently not prepared to take this further step
toward legal integration. It was argued that the Court of Justice
was essentially equipped to deal only with questions of "public
law," and that it would have to form a separate chamber to
deal with "private-law" cases of the sort that arise under the Convention. A more weighty argument was based on the proposition
that the question of the extension of the Court's role was of a more
general scope, because it arose in connection with all the "European" conventions negotiated in accordance with article 220. According to that argument, since different arrangements might be required for different conventions, an amendment to the EEC Treaty
might be more appropriate for dealing with the problem. Thus, the
working group confined itself to the promulgation of a joint declaration which was attached to the 1968 Convention102 in which the
parties affirmed their readiness to study the possibility of broadening
the jurisdiction of the Court and negotiating an agreement to that
effect. A special group has in fact been established for this purpose,103 and it has reportedly reached an agreement on a draft Pro101. See note 97 supra.
102. Declaration commune No. 3, attached to 1968 Convention.
103, CoMMlSSION, SECOND GENERAL R.El'oRT ON THE ACI'IVlTIES OF THE COMMUNI'I1ES

1968, 88 (1969).

1352

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 68:1827

tocol that would extend the Court's jurisdiction so as to enable it to
interpret the 1968 Convention in cases certified to it from national
courts in accordance with article 177.
V.

CONCLUSION

In the context of a regional integrated market, law on the recognition of companies should serve to advance the security and growth
of transnational intercourse and to free the corporate decision-maker
from unnecessary legal restraints. Perhaps because the negotiations
for the EEC Convention on Recognition of Companies began at a
relatively early date, when the Common Market was still more a
hope than a reality, the Convention in some respects falls short of
meeting this purpose. It does advance toward a stricter obligation to
recognize and toward a greater uniformity in the choice-of-law rules
accompanying recognition; but because of the many options left
open to the member states, the 1968 Convention fails to ensure true
uniform treatment and legal certainty in the practice of recognition.
The complexity of the solutions embodied in the 1968 Convention
was due largely to the divergence among the national laws, particularly to the divergence between Dutch law, which follows the incorporation principle, and the laws of the other five states, which
still largely adhere to the real-seat principle. Moreover, the differences in the application of the "real seat" rule between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the other four members also posed a
problem.104
One may only speculate what sort of document the experts could
have produced if they had directed their considerable talents and
expertise toward devising a truly new framework £or recognition,
based on a realistic analysis of the common governmental and
private interests in a modern economic union, rather than devoting
so much attention to devising ingenious escape mechanisms designed
to pacify traditional national fears and concerns. Actually, in its
basic approach and technique, the 1968 Convention differs little
from the Hague Convention, which of course was not conceived in
the context of an integrated regional market. Yet the EEC Convention has without question introduced improvements both over the
prevailing state of the national laws and over the Hague Convention. It has broadened the circle of the benefiting legal persons, it
has increased the acceptance of the incorporation principle in situations in which the registered and real seats of the company are sepa104. See note 16 supra.
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rated, and it has somewhat reduced the scope of the public-policy
exception. One may expect that the convention on safeguarding the
legal personality of a company in case of the transfer of its seat, a
convention which still remains to be negotiated in accordance with
article 220 of the EEC Treaty, 105 will carry the trend toward harmonization further, particlarly since mutual knowledge of national
laws will be increased and the differences among them will be
reduced both by national reforms and, it is also hoped, by Community coordination.
In any event, one's judgment of the EEC Convention on Recognition of Companies must be tempered by an understanding of the
political realities in Europe at the time the Convention was drafted,
including the fact that it was the first agreement reached in accordance with article 220 to supplement the EEC Treaty, and thus was
blessed with all the exaggerated care that lawyers everywhere tend to
lavish upon a "precedent." To an American la'wyer, hardened by the
disconcerting process of interest analysis which characterizes the
current uncertain state of the conflict-of-laws doctrine in the United
States, the formulas of the Convention appear at the same time too
rigid to meet the vagaries of actual life and too vague to be of real
help. One must keep in mind, of course, that the Congress of the
United States has never even entered the precincts of the choice-oflaw area-although it has had ample and unquestioned constitutional power to do so, under the full faith and credit clause and the
interstate and foreign commerce clause-but rather has abandoned
that area, for better or for worse, to the courts. In fact, the full faith
and credit clause itself, as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court, has proved to be a weak reed in the choice-of-law field. 106
Nevertheless, numerous company-related problems in the choice-oflaw field have been indirectly eliminated in the United States by the
enactment of federal legislation in other areas, particularly in the
securities area.107
In the final analysis, the EEC Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Legal Persons must be viewed in the
broader perspective of the on-going effort to fashion a modern legal
framework for transnational "European" business. This effort proceeds at three levels: the coordination . of conflicting national
policies, including economic, monetary, regional, and subsidies
105. EEC Treaty art. 220.
106. See A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 16, at 28-33.
107. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964), and Securities Exchange
Act of 19!14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1964).
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policies; second, the harmonization of national laws, including company, tax, and industrial-property laws, and the creation of new
transnational legal forms, such as the proposed "European" patent
or "European" company form; and third, the unification of national
conflicts-of-laws rules affecting the "mobility" of national companies.
The Convention on Recognition of Companies falls within the third
category, as do the proposed conventions on transnational mergers,108
transfer of company seats,109 and bankruptcy law.110 It demonstrates
the difficulties incumbent in fashioning uniform conflict-of-laws
rules among nations with divergent national laws, even when those
nations are making a conscious effort to minimize the differences in
their laws in the framework of an integrated regional community.
108. EEC Treaty art. 220; the proposed Convention is contained in Comite des
experts de !'Article 220 alinea 3 du traite C.E.E., Avant projet de Convention en matierc
de fusions internationales, 5873 /XlV/69F (mimeographed draft).
109. EEC Treaty art. 220.
110. The proposed Convention is contained in Kommission der Europaischen
Gemeinschaften, Vorentwurf eines 'Obereinkommens uber den Konkurs, den Vergleich
und Konkursahnliche Verfahren, 5267/XlV/68-D (mimeographed draft).

